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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 1183 
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-MINIMAL DIVERSITY PERMITTED BY 
THE FEDERAL !NTERPLEADER Acr SATISFIBS CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS-
A disinterested Texas bank brought a federal interpleader action under 28 
U.S.C. (1952) §1335 against a Texas widow and four joint claimants, three 
of whom were Texas citizens and the other a Tennessee citizen. On appeal 
from a summary judgment for the joint claimants, the widow argued that 
the court lacked jurisdiction. Held, affirmed. Congress intended that sec-
tion 1335 should cover these "minimal" facts. The "complete diversity'' 
requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtissi is only a rule of statutory construc-
tion and not a constitutional requirement. Haynes v. Felder, (5th Cir. 
1957) 239 F. (2d) 868. 
The Supreme Court has never expressly decided whether the Straw-
bridge rule of complete diversity is required by the Constitution's grant of 
diversity jurisdiction,2 or whether it was merely a construction of the Judi-
1 3 Cranch. (7 U.S.) 267 (1806). 
2 U.S. CoNST., art. III, §2. "The judicial power shall extend ... to Controversies-
between citizens of different states." It is clear that in Strawbridge itself, Marshall put his 
decision solely on statutory grounds. "The words of the act of congress are, 'where an 
alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and 
a citizen of another state.' The court understands these expressions to mean, that each 
distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may 
be sued, in the federal courts." Emphasis added. 
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ciary Act of 1789 which has been extended to that act's present successor, 
28 U.S.C. (1952) §1332. The question is important because federal inter-
pleader jurisdiction can be rested on two different statutes with differing 
jurisdictional requirements, section 1332 and section 1335. Interpleader 
based on rule 22 (I) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must meet the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332,3 the usual federal diversity 
provision, upon which the "complete diversity" rule of Strawbridge has 
been engrafted. Interpleader under section 1335, however, requires simply 
"two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in section 
1332 .... " The Supreme Court left the constitutional question open in 
the leading case in this area, Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.4 There a 
disinterested Washington plaintiff interpleaded Washington claimants with 
adverse Idaho claimants under section 1335's predecessor.5 By disregarding 
the plaintiff's citizenship since he made no claim to the fund, the court 
·found "complete diversity" between the two adverse claimants and thus 
avoided the constitutional problem. The court did not try to reconcile its 
decision with those cases basing jurisdiction under rule 22 (1) on diversity 
between plaintiff and claimants,6 nor did it deal with the problems raised 
when plaintiff also claims the fund.7 Other courts have also avoided the 
constitutional problem by using techniques of alignment8 and ancillary 
jurisdiction.9 In a number of cases, however, diversity jurisdiction under 
section 1335 or its predecessors has been found which seems irreconcilable 
3 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions . . . between: 
Citizens of different states." 
4 308 U.S. 66 (1939). 
5 49 Stat. 1096 (1936). The act required "two or more adverse claimants, citizens 
of different states .••. " 
6 E.g., Security Trust and Savings Bank of San Diego v. Walsh, (9th Cir. 1937) 91 F. 
(2d) 481; Rosetti v. Hill, (9th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 892, noted in 21 So. CAL. L. REv. 276 
(1948); E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v. Fort, (E.D. Mo. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 242, noted in 3 
UTAH L. REv. 529 (1953). These courts reasoned that disregarding the plaintiff's citizenship 
was improper, for he has a real interest in escaping double liability. While these cases 
standing alone are consistent with Strawbridge as a constitutional doctrine, they are 
manifestly inconsistent with Sunshine. The plaintiff's interest is the same in both cases 
and should have the same jurisdictional significance. These cases and Sunshine taken to-
gether can be reconciled with Strawbridge as constitutional only if we say that Congress 
has the power to determine the parties between whom there must be "complete diversity." 
It can then be argued that diversity between plaintiff and claimants only is relevant under 
rule 22 (1), and that diversity between adverse claimants only is relevant under §1335, 
at least where the plaintiff is disinterested. 
7 In this case it would be difficult to ignore the plaintiff's citizenship. See Chafee, 
"Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936," 49 YALE L. J. 377 at 397 (1940); Boice v. 
Boice, (3d Cir. 1943) 135 F. {2d) 919, affirming (D.C. N.J. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 183, held, 
no jurisdiction; Walmac Co., Inc. v. Isaacs, (1st Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d) 108, question dis-
cussed but left open. 
s Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, (3d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 694. Cf. 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Wilson, (E.D. S.C. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 454. 
9 Walmac Co., Inc. v. Isaacs, note 7 supra; Republic of China v. American Express Co., 
(2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 230. 
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with Strawbridge as a constitutional requirement.10 In these cases both the 
plaintiff and several adverse claimants were citizens of the same state, thus 
destroying "complete diversity" either between plaintiff and claimants, or 
between adverse claimants. All involved, however, at least one independent 
adverse claimant or group of claimants from a state different from that of 
any other claimant, who could sue or be sued by the others in a federal 
court. It is the absence of this feature which distinguishes the principal 
case. Since the Tennesseean claimed jointly with the three Texans, her 
citizenship could not be considered separately. Thus, neither of the two 
claiming parties could sue the other in a federal court,11 for there were 
Texans in both groups. The court seems correct in calling these jurisdic-
tional facts "minimal."12 The Texas widow and the Tennessee joint claim-
ant were, however, involved in a "controversy ... between citizens of dif-
ferent States," and the court squarely held that the Constitution requires no 
more than this. The widow argued that since the wording of section 1332 
and the Constitution are identical, the "complete diversity" requirement 
of section 1332 must also be required by the Constitution. The court re-
jected this argument, finding that the constitutional language could permis-
sibly be given a broader scope than identical statutory language.la In view 
of the remedial nature of the successive interpleader acts,14 the court con-
cluded that section 1335 had extended diversity jurisdiction to the full extent 
of Congress' power,15 and that the principal case fell within the act. It found 
that the only purpose of section 1335's reference to section 1332 was to 
incorporate its geographical definitions, and that the reference was not 
meant to extend section 1332's judicial gloss of "complete diversity" to 
section 1335. This interpretation seems justified since the reference to sec-
tion 1332 was added in the 1948 codification, which was not intended to 
make "controversial substantive changes."16 A minimal diversity require-
10 It should be pointed out that the constitutional problem was seldom discussed. See 
Blair Holdings Corp. v. Bay City Bank &: Trust Co., (9th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 513; 
Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 141, cert. den. 302 
U.S. 739 (1937); Pure Oil Co. v. Ross, (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 651. In Dugas v. American 
Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414 (1937), the Supreme Court treated the jurisdictional problem only 
in passing. Compare Westinghouse Electrical Corp. v. United Electrical Radio and Machine 
Workers of America, (W.D. Pa. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 841, with Sun Shipbuilding &: Dry Dock 
Co. v. Industrial Union, (E.p. Pa. 1950) 95 F. Supp. 50. . 
11 In the cases cited in note IO supra, at least one or more independent claimants 
could be found who could sue and be sued by all the others in a federal court. It can be 
argued either that this feature represents the minimum jurisdictional requirement under 
the Constitution, or that it represents the maximum jurisdictional grant of §1335. The 
court rejected both arguments. 
12 Principal case at 874. 
13 See Chafee, "Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936," 49 YALE L. J. 377 at 395 
(1940). 
14 See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., §22.09, p. 3035 (1948). 
15 Accord: Girard Trust Co. v. Vance, (E.D. Pa. 1946) 5 F.R.D. 109; Blackmar v. Mac• 
Kay, (S.D. N.Y. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 48. 
16 S. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 
2d sess., p. 15 (1948). 
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ment seems clearly useful in the interpleader area. The plaintiff bank could 
get no involuntary jurisdiction over the Tennesseean in a Texas court, and 
had the federal courts been denied it because of a "complete diversity" 
requirement, the bank faced the possibility of unwarranted double liability. 
It is to be hoped that when the Supreme Court does pass on the problems 
raised by this case, it will not make Strawbridge a constitutional strait-
jacket preventing Congress from adjusting the diversity requirement as 
necessary to meet real needs. 
Robert ]. Hoerner 
